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For almost a century and a half the Habsburgs managed to maintain two
branches and have them work together in relative harmony 1. In the diplomatic
parlance of the day the expression “House of Austria” summed up that
bicephalous reality. The Spanish branch was the senior of the two, both in terms
of birthright and in terms of the extent of its possessions. It was only towards the
end of the seventeenth century that the decline of the Spanish Monarchy and
the spectacular ascent of its Austrian counterpart brought them more or less on
a par. Until then the relative modesty of the Austrian branch had been somewhat
compensated by its virtual monopoly over the imperial dignity. The formula of
their generally harmonious relations consisted of a number of ingredients that
have often been summed up by historians. The most striking of them all was the
frequency of intermarriage and the genetic toll it would eventually levy. No less
apparent was the importance of a shared ideology that was based on the
assumption that the dynasty’s right to rule and cherish ambitions of universal
monarchy was based on its unwavering support of Roman Catholicism. The
Order of the Golden Fleece served as an instrument to reward loyal services to
either branch. Imperial prerogatives could be used to meet dynastic needs.
American silver served to maintain a network of pensioners. The overall picture
is one of a tightly knit and quite efficient family enterprise.
The Oñate Treaty that was concluded by King Philip III and Archduke
Ferdinand of Styria on 6 June 1617 is traditionally cited as the glaring exception
that confirms the rule. In brief the treaty stipulated that Philip renounced his
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claims on the kingdoms of Hungary and Bohemia in exchange for a number of
territorial concessions. Once elected Emperor, Ferdinand would invest Philip
with the Italian fiefs of Finale and Piombino. At the opportune moment, he
would also cede the strategically important Landgraviate of Alsace. In the view
of Otto Gliss, whose doctoral thesis traced the negotiations concerning the
treaty, the proceedings came close to legalized extortion. Basing his claim to
succeed to the elective thrones of Hungary and Bohemia on the rights of his
mother, Archduchess Anna of Austria, Philip demanded to be compensated for
his renunciation. Gliss considered these rights highly dubious and therefore
took a dim view on Philip’s deportment 2. More recently, Magdalena S. Sánchez
has reconsidered the King’s motives. Maintaining the label of a divided house,
she has analysed the process as one in which Philip had to make a rational choice
between the conflicting priorities of the various parts of the Spanish Monarchy.
The outcome was flawed and would soon be swept aside by the revolt in
Bohemia 3. This contribution develops a radically different argument. It relocates
the Oñate Treaty to the context of the inheritance disputes that soured relations
among the members of the Austrian branch in the first decades of the seventeenth
century and wants to demonstrate that Philip III was merely acting as the proxy
and heir apparent of his uncle and brother-in-law, Archduke Albert, when he
claimed Alsace and the Italian fiefs as his rightful part. In order to make that point
it will have to descend to the not always glamorous way in which great families
clear their internal debts.
In its third generation the Austrian branch of the House of Habsburg
suffered from an abundance of archdukes. Emperor Ferdinand I had three
surviving sons. The crowns of the Holy Roman Empire, Hungary and Bohemia
were elective and primogeniture was at that stage unknown in the Hereditary
Lands. Division therefore imposed itself. The eldest son, Maximilian II,
succeeded as emperor, king of Hungary and Bohemia and archduke of Lower
and Upper Austria. Archduke Ferdinand, the second son, was given Tyrol and
the scattered territories of Further Austria. Archduke Charles, the youngest of
the three, became the ruler of Inner Austria that comprised Styria, Carinthia and
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Carniola, as well as a number of smaller provinces to the south. Things got truly
complex when the next generation produced a multitude of grandsons. Archduke
Ferdinand of Tyrol died in 1595, leaving no legitimate male heirs. He did however
sire two morganatic sons, who were given some minor territories. The fate of the
county of Tyrol and of the rest of Further Austria was left to be decided.
Archduke Charles, on the other hand, introduced primogeniture in Inner Austria
by means of his will. Younger sons would henceforth have to content themselves
with a yearly allowance 4. As a result, his eldest son Ferdinand became his
universal heir in 1590. Ferdinand took care however to secure suitable
ecclesiastical incomes for his younger brothers 5.
The six sons of Maximilian II failed to reach such a neat arrangement. Their
father having died intestate at the Imperial Diet of 1576, Emperor Rudolf II and
the Archdukes Ernst, Matthias, Maximilian, Albert and Wenzel had to sort out the
inheritance among themselves. Matthias was in the Netherlands at the time;
Albert and Wenzel were living in Spain. Rudolf insisted that the settlement only
concerned the two Austrias. He had been elected King of Hungary (1572) and
Bohemia (1575) in his father’s lifetime and therefore considered the two kingdoms
his private property. A compromise was reached in April 1578, confirming Rudolf
as the ruler of all the territories left by his father. He promised to compensate his
brothers by paying them a yearly allowance of 45.000 German guilders (slightly
less than 33.000 ducats) each. 25.000 would be paid out of domanial revenues in
Austria, the remainder would come from Rudolf ’s private means, meaning
Hungary and Bohemia. Within three years each brother was to receive a suitable
residence in Austria. It ought to produce at least 5.000 guilders in revenue and that
amount would thereafter be deduced from their allowance. The residence and the
allowance would be hereditary and free from feudal levies 6.
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Far from safeguarding concord among the brothers, the settlement proved a
constant source of tensions. Rudolf failed to keep his obligations. He took no
efforts to ensure that the allowances were paid regularly, let alone to the full.
Contrary to the agreement, he did not assign them to specific sources of revenue.
Nor did he make haste in handing over the residences that had been singled out.
All the while Rudolf ’s brothers were more or less left to fend for themselves.
Some coped better than others. Albert and Wenzel were suitably provided for by
Philip II. Before he left for the Netherlands, Ernst acted as governor of the two
Austrias and commander in chief of the Habsburg armies in Hungary. He also
became regent of Inner Austria during part of the minority of Archduke
Ferdinand. Maximilian competed unsuccessfully for a number of prince
bishoprics before becoming Grandmaster of the Teutonic Order in 1585 7. The
dignity brought him a small state in Southern Germany and an income that
allowed him to live independently according to his station. His means increased
further when he took over from Ernst as regent in Inner Austria and became
commander of part of the Habsburg army in the war against the Turks 8. In many
ways Matthias fared worst. His ill-conceived adventure in the Netherlands
earned him the enduring wrath of Philip II, who made it a point of blocking
Matthias’ designs on the neighbouring electorate of Cologne and the prince
bishoprics of Munster or Liege 9. Similar plans to obtain an ecclesiastical
principality in Salzburg or Speyer failed as well. The situation ameliorated
somewhat when Matthias succeeded Ernst as governor of the two Austrias and
commander in chief in 1593 10. By that stage however, Rudolf ’s reluctance to
support Matthias in his quest for a suitable station and the constant wrangling
about the allowances had done much to alienate the brothers.
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Perhaps this outcome was inevitable. It had taken a lot of pressure to make
Rudolf agree to the 45.000 guilders a year in the first place 11. His original offer
had been 30.000 guilders, which was still a lot more generous than the 20.000 that
Archduke Charles would prudently apportion to each of his younger sons. Wenzel
having died before he could enter into the agreement, the total outlay due in
allowances stood at 180.000 guilders (above 130.000 ducats) a year, a sum that may
well have exceeded what Rudolf could actually afford to pay 12. Habsburg finances
were invariably strained. Considerable parts of the Austrian domains had been
pawned for ready cash, rendering them useless to provide a fixed income.
Resources were depleted even further during the Long Turkish War (1593-1606).
The death of Ernst in 1595 brought little relief. Since his allowance was hereditary,
the four remaining brothers were entitled to a quarter each. It saved Rudolf 11.250
guilders (about 8.200 ducats) a year, while raising the standard allowance to 56.250
guilders (above 41.000 ducats). In practice, only Maximilian stood to receive that
sum. Albert, who knew he would find ample compensation in the dowry of the
Infanta Isabella, passed the rise on to the impecunious Matthias; thereby
increasing the latter’s allowance to 67.500 guilders 13. Matthias’ gratitude was such
that he needed almost eight years to write a letter of thanks and even then it was
filled with complaints about arrears 14.
Yet if anyone had reason to complain, it was Albert. Matthias and
Maximilian may have received their allowances partially and haphazardly, but
at least they got something 15. Albert never saw a single kreuzer in thirty years.
When he finally took up the matter with Rudolf in the fall of 1608, the emperor
owed him at least 1.2 million guilders (over 875.000 ducats) 16. While Rudolf
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avidly accepted the exotic presents brought by Albert’s envoy, he studiously
avoided giving a clear reply to the diplomatic memoranda 17. When the answer
finally came, it proved to be most disappointing. Rudolf freely admitted that he
had never paid Albert the allowance, but then Albert had never really needed
the money anyway. He had always been amply provided for by his ecclesiastical
revenues or his wife’s dowry. Meanwhile Rudolf had spent the money “for the
common good of Christianity and the wellbeing of the august House of
Austria” in the war against the Turks. Therefore, instead of making demands,
Albert ought to be grateful and prove his gratitude by remitting whatever
Rudolf might still owe him 18. Such arguments could not sway Albert however.
It was quite obvious that benefiting from ecclesiastical revenue or not residing
in the Hereditary Lands had no bearing whatsoever on the stipulations of the
1578 agreement. He likewise rejected suggestions to cancel out the arrears in
his allowance against the taxes that the Habsburg Netherlands still had to pay the
Imperial treasury 19. Albert felt that it would have been inappropriate to pay
the so called Römermonate in the first place, since he had been fighting a lengthy
war without receiving any of the aid the Empire ought to have sent him under
the Transaction of Augsburg 20.
The suggestion to trade off allowances for taxes demonstrated how little the
public and the private spheres had been separated in the House of Habsburg.
The interplay of these two spheres complicated the search for compromise.
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Emotions and perceptions tended to get in the way of impartiality. There was
thinly veiled resentment if not jealousy on the part of Rudolf when mentioning
Albert’s marriage and dowry. No doubt he remembered how the Infanta had
once been promised to him and how he had negotiated in vain to secure the
Netherlands as her dowry. Rudolf moreover assumed that Albert had had more
than his share already. No doubt Matthias and Maximilian felt the same. There
was simply not enough to provide for everyone. Albert ruled prestigious and
potentially wealthy provinces. That ought to suffice. Albert however, drew a
clear distinction between his wife’s possessions and his own entitlement to part
of his father’s patrimony. He defined the matter in legal terms and could
summon the 1578 agreement in support of his case. His brothers took a
pragmatic view. He claimed his rightful share in the possessions of the Austrian
branch. They reckoned that he had been amply provided for by the dynasty as a
whole. The Austrian Habsburgs were paying the price for their political culture.
Their preference for piecemeal arrangements proved a source of increasing
instability. Only a general family pact could have settled the succession beyond
dispute. In the absence of it, fraternal squabbling was unavoidable. It was not so
much a lack of understanding between the Spanish and the Austrian branches,
but a lack of unity among the sons of Maximilian II that weakened the House of
Habsburg in the early seventeenth century.
For years, negotiations about the succession in Tyrol and Further Austria led
nowhere. When dividing the Hereditary Lands among his three sons, Emperor
Ferdinand I had simply laid down that if one of them died without heirs his
possessions would pass to the remaining archdukes. The wording was so vague
that it allowed widely different interpretations. Upon the death of Ferdinand of
Tyrol, Matthias, Maximilian and the archdukes of Inner Austria supposed that it
meant the Tyrolean inheritance returned to the Austrian branch as a whole.
Rudolf however invoked the Privilegium maius to demand that the principle of
primogeniture should be applied. In this line of thinking, he was the only rightful
heir. At first, neither side was prepared to yield. Since the territories could not be
left ungoverned, it was agreed to empower Rudolf to receive the constitutional
homage by the estates on behalf of the Austrian branch as a whole 21. Albert
pursued his own agenda. After taking ample information, he rallied to the
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otherwise isolated emperor, by agreeing to cede his share of the inheritance to
Rudolf 22. Yet his consent was soon followed by demands that Rudolf tried
to placate in vague and soothing terms. Albert, it now transpired, was prepared to
accept Rudolf ’s succession to Tyrol and Further Austria if he would receive part
of it in return 23. The move backfired. In February 1602 Rudolf abandoned Albert
and struck a deal with his adversaries. Tyrol and Further Austria were not to be
partitioned and would be governed in turn by the descendants of Maximilian II
and Charles of Inner Austria. The ruling archduke became regent rather than
prince. Four councillors would monitor his actions, with each branch appointing
two. Archduke Maximilian, whose solemn vows prevented him from having legal
offspring, became the first ruler 24. Having been shut out entirely, Albert simply
refused to ratify the agreement. The president of the Aulic Council, the
Landgrave of Leuchtenberg, was sent over as imperial ambassador to plead
the cause 25. Maximilian, Rudolf and Ferdinand of Inner Austria wrote persuasive
letters 26. It had little effect. Albert indicated that he was prepared to
compromise, but stuck to his demand for compensation 27. Since “the emperor
has given us absolutely nothing until now”, he wrote Maximilian, “we have to
reserve our hereditary rights on the Tyrolean portion” 28. For Albert, there could
be no settlement over Tyrol without the execution of the 1578 agreement.
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As the negotiations dragged on, Rudolf sensed the opportunity of gaining
control over Tyrol after all. In January 1609 he appeared ready to change sides
once more, asking Albert’s ambassador “what part of Further Austria Albert
desired most” and suggesting it might be the county of Ferrette (Pfirt in German),
since it was closest to the Franche-Comté 29. It seems likely though that Albert’s
ambitions were not limited to Ferrette alone. The county had long merged with
the Sundgau, the core of Habsburg possessions in Alsace. The aspiration to
acquire the whole of Habsburg Alsace, thereby extending the Franche-Comté
to the banks of the Rhine, was already cherished by the Dukes of Burgundy. The
strategic importance of the region increased further still when it became part of
the Spanish Road between Milan and the Netherlands 30. Albert and Isabella
passed through the Sundgau in August 1599 31. Apparently, the region caught
Albert’s attention and he sought means of extending his influence there. The
sustained nature of Albert’s interest in expanding his control into the region of
Alsace should not be underestimated. Everything suggests that this was where he
hoped to obtain his share in the patrimony of the Austrian Habsburgs. 
While trying to divert this unwelcome attention, his brothers once
mentioned Finale and Piombino 32. Finale was a strategic port on the Ligurian
coast. It constituted a small fief of the Holy Roman Empire and had become a
Spanish protectorate in the 1570s. Early in 1598 the local margrave sold his
remaining rights to Philip II, but Rudolf withheld the necessary imperial assent.
His refusal only hardened when Spanish troops occupied Finale in 1602 33.
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Piombino was in a comparable situation. The principality and its port on the
northern reaches of the Tyrrhenian Sea lay within reach of the Spanish held
Stato dei Presidi. This proved decisive when a succession crisis erupted at the
death of the local prince in 1603. On the pretext of defending the rights of one of
the claimants, Spanish troops were quick to occupy the principality and had
every intention of staying there 34. Under these circumstances a nominal transfer
of both these territories to Albert probably looked like an elegant solution. Albert
did not rise to the bait however, at least not for the time being. If he had accepted
Finale or Piombino at that stage, he would merely have stood in as Spain’s proxy.
His own designs were on the banks of the Rhine, not on the coasts of the
Mediterranean. Even then, it is truly significant to see the cession of Alsace,
Finale and Piombino being discussed as early as 1609. Within a decade these
three possessions were to be the prize of the Oñate Treaty.
Matters still stood there after the death of Rudolf II and the succession of his
brother Matthias. Not without reason, Matthias’ favourite Bishop Melchior
Khlesl called the negotiations “a great labyrinth” 35. Distinguishing between the
succession as pertaining to the public sphere and the others as merely private
matters would be a gross anachronism. To Albert and the other members of the
House of Habsburg these issues were inextricably intertwined and had to be
resolved by means of a package deal. The outcome of the negotiations of the years
1613-1617 can only be understood if all dimensions of the settlement are taken
into account. Any treatment that focuses on the political aspects and ignores the
financial and the material is therefore bound to draw wrong or at any rate one
sided conclusions.
In February 1614 Albert summed up his views on the state of affairs in the
set of instructions he gave to Jacques de Zeelandre, who was to become his
envoy at the Imperial Court. The brief itemized his outstanding claims,
beginning with the yearly allowance of 45.000 German guilders (around 33.000
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ducats) that had been agreed upon at the partition of the inheritance of
Maximilian II in 1578. In violation of the terms of the agreement, none of the
allowance had ever been assigned on domanial income in Austria, Bohemia and
Hungary. Rudolf had never paid a Kreutzer. Matthias had repeatedly promised
to make amends, but had so far failed to do so. The situation was more or less
the same with regards to the share that Albert had inherited of the allowance of
his brother Ernst. Since the death of Rudolf, that now amounted to 15.000
guilders yearly. In the course of Rudolf ’s reign arrears on the allowances had
accrued to 1,2 million guilders (875.000 ducats). Since then payments had fallen
behind with another 200.000 guilders (above 145.000 ducats). The cession of
three lordships in Austria had been proposed but never seen through. Nor had
Albert ever been put in possession of the residence that ought to have been
provided according to the agreement of 1578. The one area in which some
progress had been made concerned the movables of Rudolf and there again a
considerable balance remained to be settled 36.
Before de Zeelandre was put in charge, negotiations had been in the hands of
Ottavio Visconti and Peter Peckius, two experienced diplomats in the archducal
service. After much discussion an interim agreement had been reached on 13
February 1613. Regarding the yearly allowance it stipulated that Matthias would
pay Albert 60.000 guilders (almost 44.000 ducats) a year, being the combined sum
of the original allowance and the third that Albert was entitled to out of Ernst’s
portion. Payments were to be made in three instalments and would at last be
assigned to proper sources of domanial revenue 37. Shortly after his first audience
in Linz, De Zeelandre found out that Matthias’ willingness to pay was not
matched by his ability. The treasuries of Austria, Hungary and Bohemia were as
good as empty 38. A sympathetic Maximilian told him that treasury officials
would only work when one “promises them very nice gifts like chains and gilded
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cups” 39. Albert seems to have anticipated as much. When the Spanish ambassador
at the Imperial Court, don Baltasar de Zúñiga, was finally allowed to marry one of
Isabella’s ladies-in-waiting in December 1612, he promised the groom a gift
of 24.000 guilders (about 17.500 ducats) to be “drawn from his hereditary portion”,
thereby ensuring himself of a powerful advocate 40. The first 7.700 guilders that
De Zeelandre managed to scrape together were entirely spent on presents. Zúñiga
was given a first 3.000. Khlesl received 1.200. Sums ranging from 900 to 60
guilders were given to high ranking courtiers of the Emperor and Empress and to
various officials of the Hofkammer 41. Gradually and hardly ever without an effort
on the part of de Zeelandre, sums came trickling in 42. His tenacity paid off. In the
space of five years the arrears fell from 200.000 guilders (above 145.000 ducats) in
February 1614 to 62.000 (or 45.000 ducats) by November 1619 43.
On the other hand the problem of the arrears incurred during the reign of
Rudolf II, remained as intractable as ever. Given that Matthias was already
struggling to pay the current allowance, it was inconceivable that he would ever
be able to redeem the outstanding debt of 1.2 million guilders. A substantial
transfer of property seemed the only option to wipe the slate clean. Five years
after Albert had chosen to ignore the suggestion of Finale, he relented and
allowed his envoy to inquire into the matter 44. The moot question of course was
at what level the transfer of Finale –and possibly even Piombino– would be
taxed. While the estimates for the two together were initially put at around
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200.000 guilders (close to 146.000 ducats), Khlesl then intervened and pushed
the price for Finale alone up to 3 million (almost 2.2 million ducats) 45. Even
though there was some reason to believe that Matthias was actually prepared to
transfer the fief for a sixth of that amount, he stuck to his minister as usual
and wrote Albert a letter explaining that in view of the town’s valuable harbour and
fortifications this was really the lowest he could possibly go 46. Zúñiga qualified
the offer as nonsense, while De Zeelandre pointed out that it would turn Albert
from a creditor into a debtor overnight 47. The proposition effectively ended the
negotiations. Hoping to revive the talks, De Zeelandre tried one stratagem after
another 48. None of it had any effect however, until the matter was again taken
up in the direct negotiations between the Spanish and the Austrian branches of
the dynasty in view of arranging the succession of Hungary and Bohemia.
The finality of the debate had shifted however. At the onset, the transfer of
Finale and Piombino had been put on the table as an alternative solution for
Albert’s demand to share in the territories that had formally belonged to
Archduke Ferdinand of Tyrol. Henceforth it was considered a means of
liquidating the arrears on the yearly allowance. By consequence, his territorial
claims were once again on the agenda. The shift certainly suited Albert’s
ambitions. Upon learning the news of Rudolf ’s death, he had almost
immediately notified Khlesl that the renunciation of his rights on Tyrol and
Further Austria had been made to Rudolf personally and had therefore now
come to cease 49. Reviving his claims not only benefited Albert, but also his
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49     ARA, Duitse Staatssecretarie 42, fol. 16: Archduke Albert to Bishop Melchior Khlesl,
4 Feb. 1612.
II.6 Duerloo_Maquetación 1  25/04/11  16:06  Página 545
nephew and eventual heir, Philip III. Out of the 16 children of Maximilian II,
only two had produced any grandchildren. Only one of these, Philip III of Spain,
had survived to adulthood. The fact that he was not an agnatic descendant did not
shut him out of the inheritance altogether. After all, Hungary and Bohemia had
come to the Austrian branch through the female line. Philip had asserted his
rights in December 1609 by declaring his willingness to be elected King of the
Romans. His formal recognition as heir to the Habsburg Netherlands in the spring
of 1616 strengthened his hand ever further. Albert even suggested the strategy
that Philip would have to pursue in order to obtain a portion of the inheritance
during a candid conversation with Spínola in June 1613. In Albert’s opinion,
Philip should renounce his rights on Hungary and Bohemia in exchange for
Tyrol and Alsace, two territories that would be of far greater strategic importance
to him 50. Spínola concurred, reiterating the point in several of his dispatches.
When it became clear that the Austrian archdukes were not at all prepared to cede
the entire inheritance of Ferdinand of Tyrol to their Spanish cousins, he
advocated scaling down Philip’s demands to the transfer of Alsace 51.
The proposal stemmed from a logic that gave priority to the Habsburg
presence in the Low Countries. Astride some of the routes linking the Franche-
Comté to Luxembourg, Alsace was of considerable importance for the logistics
of the Army of Flanders. Yet in the far flung interests of the Spanish Monarchy,
other logics produced other priorities. As ambassador at the Imperial Court,
Zúñiga sought to extend the Monarchy’s influence in Central Europe and
therefore believed that the King –or one of his younger sons– ought to accede
to the thrones of Hungary, Bohemia and ultimately of the Empire too. Among
the leading members of the Spanish Council of State however, the Duke of
Infantado held that Spain would be best served by strengthening her grip on
the Mediterranean basin and should consequently pursue territorial expansion
in Italy 52. Confronted with three sets of logic and priorities, it was for the King
to decide which of these –or any combination of these– would prevail.
When considering his options, Philip could not limit himself to pondering
conflicting priorities. As head of the House of Habsburg, he also had to bear the
interests of the dynasty as a whole in mind. The situation had changed
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considerably over the last quarter of the century. In 1590 there had been four
reigning branches. The line of Ferdinand of Tyrol had failed in 1595. The recent
miscarriage of Empress Anna had made it clear that sooner or later the line of
Maximilian II would end too. Only the line of the Kings of Spain and that of the
Archdukes of Inner Austria would continue into the next generation. Philip III
had three sons that had survived infancy. So did Ferdinand of Inner Austria,
although his eldest son, John Charles, was to die in 1619 at the age of 14.
Ferdinand moreover had three brothers, albeit that they had been given suitable
positions in the Germania sacra. If nothing else, Habsburg marital strategies
made the two branches dependent upon each other. Ferdinand was not only
Philip’s second cousin. Until the death of Queen Margaret, he had also been his
brother-in-law. In keeping with family traditions, he might –and eventually
would– become the father-in-law to one of Philip’s children. It was in the
overriding interest of the dynasty to work out some sort of an accommodation.
Barely concealing his annoyance, Matthias responded to a joint appeal to
conclude by Maximilian and Albert in the fall of 1616. He claimed that if it had
been for him the succession would have been settled already, but that the
indecision of the King of Spain was needlessly holding things up 53. There was
a fair amount of truth in that assertion, but only up to a point. It did indeed take a
while for Philip to make up his mind about the price for his renunciation. Albert
sent several letters to stress the urgency of securing the succession and enlisted
the services of Spínola and the Spanish ambassador to do the same 54. On 14
November Philip announced that he had reached a decision. He did not give any
specifics, but assured Albert that he would be fully informed by Spínola 55. The
news reached Brussels in the middle of December and was instantly relayed to
the Imperial Court 56. Once stated, Philip’s demands were clear enough. Without
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53     HHStA, Belgische Korrespondenz 10, 1/27 and 1/60: Emperor Matthias to Archduke
Albert, 30 Sep. and 19 Nov. 1616.
54     AGS, Estado 2299: Archduke Albert to King Philip III, 30 Apr. and 28 May 1616;
The Marquess of Guadalest to King Philip III, 29 May 1616; 2300: Ambrogio Spínola to
King Philip III, 30 Oct. 1616.
55     ARA, Secretarie van Staat en Oorlog 180, fol. 247: King Philip III to Archduke
Albert, 14 Nov. 1616.
56     ARA, Secretarie van Staat en Oorlog 180, fol. 307: Archduke Albert to King Philip
III, 18 Dec. 1616; fol. 316: Archduke Albert to Emperor Matthias, 22 Dec. 1616.
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saying as much, he acted as Albert’s heir and sought to obtain what his uncle had
been claiming for years. In exchange for the renunciation of his claims to
Hungary and Bohemia, Philip wanted the cession of Alsace as well as the
investiture with the fiefs of Finale and Piombino. It has been alleged that by
making these demands Philip gave precedence to his own interests over those of
the dynasty, thereby weakening the solidarity among its members 57. Attractive as
such an interpretation might seem, the evidence at hand establishes that Alsace,
Finale and Piombino had been on the negotiation table for many years and that
the only novelty lay in the fact that they were now being claimed by Philip –quite
literally– instead of Albert.
This time however there was no more room for ruse or delays. With
Matthias’ health faltering, Ferdinand had no other option but to accept Philip’s
conditions, albeit with the proviso that they would only be met after he had
been crowned Emperor 58. Don Baltasar de Zúñiga had conducted most of the
negotiations during the last months of his term as Spanish ambassador at
the Imperial Court. His successor, Don Iñigo Vélez de Guevara, count of Oñate,
finalized the treaty on 6 June 1617 and reaped the honour of seeing his name
attached to it 59. Maximilian and Albert followed suit by formally renouncing
their rights on the Hungarian and Bohemian successions two days later 60. A
buoyant Maximilian was making plans to commemorate the success of his
endeavours with the donation of a silver lamp to the Virgin of Halle 61. Albert
could warm to the thought that Ferdinand undertook to compensate him with
an annuity of 100.000 German guilders (some 73.000 ducats) and the choice of
a suitable residence in Austria 62.
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Historians are often tempted to judge the legality of a claim in relation to its
outcome. Aided by the benefit of hindsight, we tend to side with the winners.
The present contribution demonstrates that the territories singled out in the
secret clauses of the Oñate Treaty were not randomly selected in an exercise to
demonstrate the power of Spain and exploit the dependency of a beleaguered
Archduke Ferdinand of Styria. Nor were they solely or even primarily the
product of a rational choice by Philip III and his ministers. They were the outcome
of a long and tortuous process of negotiations in which Archduke Albert sought
to obtain a fair share of the possessions of the Austrian branch and a reasonable
compensation for the yearly allowances that had never been paid. When
Albert’s health took a turn for the worse in the winter of 1613-1614, it was
decided to proceed with the recognition of Philip III as heir to the Habsburg
Netherlands. Acting in that capacity, he had every right in the dynastic political
culture of the day to claim those territories that could be considered his uncle’s
due.
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